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THE PAROL EViDENCE RULE AND THIRD PARTIES
I. INTRODUCTION
To discuss the parol evidence rule with any degree of clarity, it is imperative
at the outset to distinguish between the rule in theory and in practice--between
the rule as restated and accepted by the most eminent authorities' and the rule
as interpreted and applied by the courts. While, on its face, the statement of
the rule is relatively simple and straightforward, the determination of what the
rule actually means and when it may be invoked to bar the introduction of
extrinsic evidence has been a subject of widespread debate. Despite what the
"'hombook" definition would lead the uninitiated to believe, "[t]he parol evidence
rule . ..can hardly be considered as an all-inclusive and automatic or self-
operating rule of law. Its practical application presents many problems" 2 -prob-
lems which are reflected in confused and contradictory judicial decisions "ad-
versely affecting both the counseling of clients and the litigation process."3 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court aptly characterized the practical status of the parol
evidence rule when it said:
There is scarcely any subject more perplexed than in what cases, and to what ex-
tent, parol evidence shall be admitted. Not only have different men viewed the subject
differently, but the same man, at different times, has held opinions not easily
reconciled....4
What may appear to be a "simple" rule "is in fact a maze of conflicting tests,
subrules, and exceptions. . .Y5 which serve to make the admissibility of the parol
evidence in any given case more dependent upon the facts in issue than upon
the letter of the rule.(
This lack of uniformity of application has been attributed to the fact that
"[c]ourts expect this apparently simple rule to accomplish many objectives."'
1. "When two parties have made a contract and have expressed in a writing to which
they have both assented as the complete and accurate integration of that contract, evidence,
whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent understandings and negotiations will not be
admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the writing." 3 A. Corbin, Contracts
§ 573, at 357 (1960) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Corbin]. "Briefly stated, [the
parol evidence] rule requires ...the exclusion of extrinsic evidence, oral or vritten, where
the parties have reduced their agreement to an integrated writing." 4 S. Williston, Contracts
§ 631, at 948-49 (3d ed. 1961) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Vrlliston]. Other
authorities agree in principle with the above. See 1 S. Greenleaf, Evidence § 275 (15th ed.
1892); G. Grismore, Contracts § 94 (rev. ed. 1965).
2. Rinaudo v. Bloom, 209 Md. 1, 9, 120 A.2d 184, 189 (1956).
3. Sweet, Contract Making and Parol Evidence: Diagnosis and Treatment of a Sick Rule,
53 Cornell L. Rev. 1036 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Sweet].
4. Thompson v. M'Clenachan, 17 S. & R. 110, 113 (Pa. 1827).
5. Sweet 1036.
6. See 9 3. Wigmore, Evidence § 2400 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as Wigmore].
7. Sweet 1036. There being nothing inherent in the law of contracts which requires the
existence of such a rule, the parol evidence rule was created and designed to accomplish
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As a result, various commentators have criticized the rule for creating confusion
rather than certainty and have urged that its role in the modern commercial
context be reevaluated. 8 However, bench and bar have yet to be totally con-
vinced.9 It would seem that many courts feel that they can make do with the
rule as traditionally understood and applied. Perhaps out of hesitancy to abandon
or reformulate a rule which has become almost second nature,' 0 while at the
same time recognizing that such a rule does have pronounced shortcomings, these
courts have attempted to make the rule more flexible by creating numerous
exceptions to it" or by otherwise premising its application on the concept of
estoppel.12
The manner in which the parol evidence rule has been applied to third
parties's-persons who neither participated in the formulation of the agreement
certain legal and business objectives. See Wigmore § 2426, at 80; notes 20-25 infra and
accompanying text for a discussion of the policy which underscores the existence of the rule.
8. Accepting that the rule must be lived with, various commentators, and in particular
Professor Corbin, have urged that the rule must be reevaluated. They assert that the pro-
tection of a total integration determined from the actual intent of the parties provides the
only rational justification for the existence of the parol evidence rule today. See, e.g., Corbin
§§ 573-96; Calamari & Perillo, A Plea for a Uniform Parol Evidence Rule and Principles of
Contract Interpretation, 42 Ind. L.J. 333 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Calamari & Perillo];
Sweet 1036. Others have urged that the rule be limited to a rebuttable presumption that the
writing represents the final and complete agreement of the parties. See Hale, The Parol
Evidence Rule, 4 Ore. L. Rev. 91, 122 (1925); Note, A Critique of the Parol Evidence Rule
in Pennsylvania, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 703, 721 (1952). In practice this amounts to the same
thing since evidence of the actual intent of the parties would be admissible to rebut the
presumption and, if believed, it would indicate that the writing was not an integration. The
distinction is that the presumption theory makes the question one of weight of the evidence
rather than admissibility.
9. The trend of modem decisions is recognized to be "toward increasing liberality in the
admission of parol agreements." Williston § 638, at 1045 (footnote omitted). This trend is
largely due to the efforts of Professor Corbin. As the Superior Court of New Jersey noted
in Garden State Plaza Corp. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 78 N.J. Super. 485, 189 A.2d 448 (App.
Div.), certification denied, 40 N.J. 226, 191 A.2d 63 (1963), "the astute and realistic analysis
of problems in this field by Professor Corbin has had particular influence on our courts in
recent years . . . ." Id. at 497, 189 A.2d at 454. However, it is difficult for some courts to
break away from the traditional logic. See, e.g., Joseph v. Mahoney Corp., 367 S.W.2d 213
(Tex. Civ. App. 1963). There a written lease contained a provision requiring the lessee to
pay certain taxes on the property. The lessee attempted to introduce evidence to prove that
he had signed the lease only after receiving, and in reliance upon, the lessor's promise that
he could disregard that provision. The court found that the lease was a fully integrated
agreement and could not be contradicted by parol testimony. In conclusion the court stated:
"We give a careful consideration to 3 Corbin on Contracts, Sec. 573 et seq. and other texts
as presented by appellant and the several cases cited, but believe we have applied the law
as existing now in this State." Id. at 216.
10. See Sweet 1049.
11. See notes 37-38 infra and accompanying text.
12. See note 40 infra.
13. See notes 125-40 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinctions made
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nor assented to it in its written form-lends support to this hypothesis. By
narrowing the focus to the third party area, the policy basis for the existence of
any parol evidence rule becomes more dearly defined; the confusion and contra-
diction attending the traditional formulation of the rule become more pro-
nounced; and the logic and rhetoric of those courts which would routinely
apply such a rule as between the original parties to a written contract become
more suspect.
H. Tm RATIONALE BERMn TE PAROL EvmxEiic RuLE
It has been said that "the parol evidence rule is a fundamental rule of sub-
stantive law 'resting on a rational foundation of experience and policy' and is
essential to the certainty and stability of written obligations."' 4 However, if the
criticism directed at the rule is warranted, then the parol evidence rule as tradi-
tionally understood and applied neither rests upon a fundamentally sound policy
basis nor serves an essential function in the modem commercial context.
It is generally agreed that the parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive law
and not an exclusionary rule of evidence. 1r As such, it excludes all proof of prior
or contemporaneous oral agreements which may tend to vary or contradict an
integrated written contract, not because such evidence is without probative value
but because it is legally ineffective.' 6 Classification of the rule as one of sub-
stantive law-a rule which "creates, defines, and regulates"' 7 the legal rights of
parties-rather than as a rule of evidence or procedure, indicates the relative
status of the rule in the law.' 8 However, this should not lead to the assumption
that the rule is self-determining or can stand divorced from the "foundation of
experience and policy" which supports its existence.
by various courts based upon the relationship of the third party to the original parties to the
contract and the nature of the rights that the third party is seeking to enforce.
14. Schwartz v. Zaconick, 68 So. 2d 173, 175 (Fla. 1953). The court here appeared to be
citing Wigmore § 2426, at 80.
15. "The decisions are now overwhelmingly in accord with the doctrine of the Restate-
ment that the rule is fundamentally a rule of substantive law." E. Morgan, Basic Problems
of Evidence 399 (1962) (footnote omitted). See, e.g., Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79 (2d Cir.
1956); Higgs v. de Maziroff, 263 N.Y. 473, 189 N.E. 555 (1934). However, the misnomer-
the parol "evidence" rule-continues to create problems. See Corbin § 573; Wigmore
§ 2400(1).
16. The rule determines legal operation and not merely the admissibility of evidence.
See, e.g., Tahoe Nat'l Bank v. Phillips, 4 Cal. 3d 11, 480 P.2d 320, 92 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1971).
The federal courts must apply the parol evidence rule in accordance with local state law.
United States v. Hastings Motor Truck Co., 460 F.2d 1159, 1161 (8th Cir. 1972); Long v.
Morris, 128 F.2d 653 (3d Cir. 1942).
17. Black's Law Dictionary 1598 (4th ed. 1968).
18. "The fact that the rule has been stated in such a definite and dogmatic form ... is
unfortunate. It has an air of authority and certainty that has grown with much repetition.
Without doubt, it has deterred counsel from making an adequate analysis and research ....
Without doubt, also, it has caused a court to refuse to hear testimony that ought to have
been heard." Corbin § 582, at 447.
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Historically,1 the parol evidence rule was ostensibly designed to promote
certainty and stability in commercial transactions by insuring the legal enforce-
ability of written contracts3° The existence of the rule rests upon two basic
premises: 1) that written evidence is more accurate and reliable than the ability
of human memory to detail the terms of contractual agreements; 21 and 2) that
where contracting parties have set their agreement down in writing it is only
reasonable to assume that they have included therein every material term and
circumstance.
22
Both of these premises, and the resulting policy decision to afford legal protec-
tion to written contracts, have their roots in the common law belief in certainty
of form2 3 and the concomitant fear that the judicial process will be compromised
by the unrestricted introduction of oral testimony.2 4 To allow extrinsic evidence
to be admitted to vary or contradict the terms of a written agreement would,
at worst, open the door to perjury by parties interested in the outcome of the
litigation and, at best, put the writing at the mercy of uncertain memory.
Furthermore, the fact-finder could not be trusted to appreciate the role played by
written agreements in commercial transactions or to distinguish valid parol
agreements from mere negotiation or wishful thinking. 25
Assuming that these premises and fears were well-founded, it was presumed
that the expectations of contractors could be better protected, reliance upon
written documents fostered, and the integrity of the judicial process preserved,
by declaring final written agreements to be just that-final and no longer sus-
ceptible to variation by parol evidence of prior understandings. Simply by
19. For a discussion of the history and development of the rule see Wigmore § 2426. For
a discussion by an early proponent of the rule see 2 J. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evi-
dence 454-513, 485 (1827).
20. Cargill Comm'n Co. v. Swartwood, 159 Minn. 1, 7, 198 N.W. 536, 538 (1924). See
also C. McCormick, Evidence § 210 (1954) [hereinafter cited as McCormick].
21. See National Bank & Trust Co. v. Becker, 38 Ill. App. 2d 307, 311, 187 N.E.2d 355,
357 (1962); Note, The Parol Evidence Rule: Is It Necessary? 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 972, 982
(1969).
22. See Ellis v. Klaff, 96 Cal. App. 2d 471, 476, 216 P.2d 15, 19 (2d Dist. 1950); Sack
Lumber Co. v. City of Sargent, 179 Neb. 848, 852, 140 N.W.2d 796, 799 (1966).
23. See Calamari & Perillo 341. "The policy of [the parol evidence rule] is somewhat
similar to that of the Statute of Frauds." E. Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence 414 (1962).
Corbin criticizes the policy and application of both: "They appear to have a similar pur-
pose .... [Tihat purpose is the prevention of successful fraud and perjury. In each case,
this purpose is only haltingly attained; and if attained at all it is at the expense and to
the injury of many honest contractors. . . . Both may have done more harm than good.
Both have been convenient hooks on which a judge can support a decision actually reached
on other grounds. Both are attempts to determine justice and the truth by a mechanistic de-
vice alike evidencing a distrust of the capacity of courts and juries to weigh human credibility.
And both alike have forced the courts, in the effort to prevent them from doing gross In-
justice to honest men, to make numerous exceptions and fine distinctions .... " Corbin
§ 575, at 380.
24. McCormick § 211, at 429.
25. Id. § 210, at 428.
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putting their final agreement into a complete written form, contractors could rest
assured that their bargain would be enforced as made without fear of fraudulent
alteration or judicial interference. This rationale might be acceptable if the parol
evidence rule actually serves to promote certainty and confidence in commercial
transactions or if the fear of perjury and the distrust of the jury are warranted.
Neither seems to be the case.
The parol evidence rule cannot be justified on the ground that it serves to
control the jury and effectively eliminates the temptation to perjury. Through-
out legal history the fear of perjury seems to have been overemphasized. 20 Con-
ceding that written evidence may be more trustworthy than oral testimony and
that some parties will indeed offer perjurious testimony if given the opportunity,
this does not justify a priori denial of the right to have the fact-finder consider
all the evidence. Certainly, the fact that the writing contains no reference to the
alleged oral agreement may be considered as relevant in determining whether a
prior agreement was in fact made.27 However, the simple "fact that the prior
agreement was oral should not preclude its proof."
28
Similarly, there is no evidence to support the conclusion that jurors are in-
capable of dealing with parol agreements. Surveys have shown and commentators
have taken the position that juries are indeed competent to weigh the credibility
of evidence and the demeanor of witnesses in an objective manner.2 ' Although
"[a] t an early date it was felt (and the feeling strongly remains) that writings
require the special protection that is afforded by removing [the issue of parol
variations] from the province of unsophisticated jurors,"30 it is highly debatable
whether today's juries fit the mold cast for them by the early advocates of this
position. Juries have proven themselves capable of handling evidence which is
just as complex and technical as any they would encounter in litigation involving
the parol evidence rule.31 Likewise, the allegation that juries are gullible or will be
26. Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 Yale L.J. 863 (1933).
"Perjury is one of the great bugaboos of the law. Every change in procedure by which the
disclosure of the truth has been made easier has raised the spectre of perjury to frighten the
profession." Id. at 867. The fear that interested parties would perjure themselves was a major
factor in prolonging the archaic rule which disqualified parties from testifying at all. Calamari
& Perillo 342.
27. The more complete and formal the instrument, the more likely it was intended to be
an integration. See Di Menna v. Cooper & Evans Co., 220 N.Y. 391, 397, 115 N.E. 993, 995
(1917) ; Corbin § 581. The mere fact that the evidence is heard and weighed does not mean
that it must be accepted as true. See Corbin § 583, at 474-75; Sweet 1054.
28. Sweet 1054.
29. See 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev., supra note 21, at 984-85, & nn.68-72.
30. Calamari & Perillo 334-35 (footnote omitted).
31. That it is not the nature of contractual relationships or the technical aspects of con-
tract law that require the removal of such issues from the hands of the jury is evidenced by
the fact that where the alleged prior agreement and subsequent agreement are both oral, the
jury decides whether, in fact, the parties intended to incorporate their entire agreement into
the subsequent contract. See also Murray, The Parol Evidence Rule: A Clarification, 4
Duquesne U.L. Rev. 337, 342 (1966).
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guided by their sympathies with a party who, having made a bad bargain now
faces hardship or forfeiture, is nothing more than legal folklore.8 2
It is the function of the jury in our legal system to determine questions of fact
and weigh the credibility of witnesses. This function should not be abrogated
without good reason. The removal of questions of fact from the province of the
jury simply because a written document is at issue is not adequate justification. 8
Nor has the granting of special protection to writings resulted in commercial
stability or the fostering of reliance upon written documents. Not only is the
premise that parties naturally reduce their entire agreements to writing doubtful,
but also the spectre of the parol evidence rule seems to have had little or no
effect in inducing them to do so.34 True, it is good business practice to set down
all the terms of an agreement in black and white, and most contractors feel more
secure in so doing. However, this does not mean that oral contracts should be
any less valid and binding. Moreover, the extent to which the agreement is
reduced to writing may be directly related to the nature of the transaction and
the relationship of the parties. Where parties know one another or have had a
history of prior dealings, their agreement is more likely to include "understand-
ings" not incorporated into the written form.8 5 To say that such terms are not
part of the agreement merely because they are not expressed in the writing, may
result in the legal enforcement of a contract which the parties did not in fact
make.36 The fact of the matter, therefore, is that the parol evidence rule may
exclude as much true as perjured testimony and, in many instances, frustrate
rather than protect the actual intentions of the contracting parties.
If the rule were applied to its full letter, it might indeed create that degree of
practical certainty which it professes to be seeking. Contractors would fail to put
their entire agreement into writing at their peril. The law would presume that the
agreement is complete and enforce it as written without question or conscience.
Trusting, gullible or careless parties would learn the hard way and would be the
wiser for it. However, the actual state of contract-making simply does not meet
this ideal. As at least one court, over a hundred years ago, recognized:
In theory, adhere to the writing-neither see nor hear any thing out of the deed,
32. See 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev., supra note 21, at 984-85. But see McCormick § 210, at 428;
McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for Control of the Jury, 41
Yale L.J. 365, 368 (1932).
33. Most of the issues raised in the application of the rule are questions of fact. Corbin
§ 595, at 570. Moreover, the parol evidence rule is not the only means available for con-
trolling the jury, if indeed that is necessary. See Sweet 1055-56; cf. Calamari & Perillo 351.
But see McCormick, supra note 32, at 378-79, where the author asserts that the usual means
of jury-control are inadequate when a writing is involved.
34. See Sweet 1047.
35. The Uniform Commercial Code expressly recognizes that a history of prior dealings
should become part of the contract unless clearly negated. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-
202, Comment 2.
36. Since parties do not always put their entire agreement into writing, the exclusion of




seems to sound well; and it would work well in practice, if all who gave instructions
to scriveners were perfect; if all scriveners perfectly understood their instructions,
and put them on paper perfectly according to law.. . but when this perfection cannot
be even imagined to exist in this world. . . the beautiful theory must yield to sub-
stantial justice.37
Consequently, the parol evidence rule has been riddled with exceptionss in an
effort to avoid harshness and do "substantial justice." What was in essence a
rule of forfeiture has become a rule of caution. Courts continue to employ the
traditional rhetoric which accompanies the rule, but citation to authority in most
jurisdictions is usually worthless "without minute analysis of the facts" of each
particular case.39
Another possible basis advanced by some courts to justify application of the
rule is the concept of estoppel. 4 Estoppel does not supplant the traditional policy
objectives of the parol evidence rule. Rather, it seems to reflect a different
attitude toward the rule and the goals to be achieved. For those contractors who
take the precaution of reducing their entire agreement to writing, the parol
evidence rule will provide protection against alteration by a dissatisfied adversary
or an incompetent jury. Where parties have committed their entire agreement
to writing in a form which embodies a complete and enforceable legal obligation,
they will be estopped from later attempting to alter or contradict its terms.
A court which views the rule in this way must also ask itself in each particular
case whether there exists any justifiable reason why this party seeking to vary
or contradict the writing should not be so estopped. The facts of each particular
case, therefore, rather than the mere presence of a written document become
determinative. The end result remains a "rule" whose practical application
presents many problems.
III. THERE Is No UNMORM PAROL EViDENcE RuLE
A. The Integration Conflict
Not only is the rationale behind the parol evidence rule suspect, but also the
rule as practically applied has been severely criticized as creating confusion rather
than commercial stability.41 The major difficulty stems from the fact that there
is no one universally accepted formulation of what the parol evidence rule is, and
37. Thompson v. M'Clenachan, 17 S. & R. 110, 113 (Pa. 1827).
38. See, e.g., Young v. United States, 327 F.2d 933, 935 (5th Cir. 1964). For a general
discussion of the so-called "exceptions" to the rule see J. Prince, Richardson on Evidence
§§ 583-90 (9th ed. 1964).
39. See Mitchill v. Lath, 247 N.Y. 377, 388, 160 N.E. 646, 650 (1928) (Lehman, J., dis-
senting).
40. See, e.g., Root v. John T. Robinson Co., 55 F.2d 303, 304 (D. MAtass. 1931); Enos v.
Leediker, 214 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) (parol evidence rule works "a legal
as distinguished from an equitable estoppel").
41. See Corbin § 575; Wigmore §§ 2430-31; Calamari & Perillo; Hale, The Parol Evi-
dence Rule, 4 Ore. L. Rev. 91 (1925) (Hale went so far as to term the rule ua positive
menace to the due administration of justice." Id. at 91).
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when or how it should be applied.42 Moreover, few courts have made a concerted
effort to clarify the situation.43 "In hundreds of cases stating and purporting to
apply the 'parol evidence rule,' the reported opinion does not show the basis of
the court's finding . . . . 44 In such cases, courts have been prone to cite the
analysis of various commentators in series, as if their views were in complete
harmony, before proceeding to conclude rather matter of factly that the evidence
offered has been admitted or excluded in accordance with the "parol evidence
rule." No reference is made to the fact that the views cited are radically
dissimilar. No indication is given as to which view the court adopted and why.
In other cases where a court does single out a particular view, the result may
well turn out to be inconsistent with that commentator's analysis. 48 Even where
some degree of consistency in theory and result has been achieved, the decisions
have been attacked for attaining consistency at the expense of the expectations
of innocent contractors or for straining the facts to bring the case within one of
the exceptions to the parol evidence rule 4° In all cases, the decisions reached are
so dependent upon the facts in issue and the type of evidence offered4 7 that their
value as precedent is limited. The analysis contained in such opinions affords
little guidance to the practitioner who must attempt to counsel a client and
predict the outcome of litigation involving a parol evidence question.48
Such decisions, in sum, do nothing more than restate the accepted definition of
42. Dean Wigmore attributes the confusion and obscurity of the parol evidence rule to
"[t]wo circumstances... first, an inherent necessity for certain distinctions, simple In them-
selves but subtle and elusive in their application, and, secondly, the unfortunate prevalence
of a terminology in which the subject cannot possibly be discussed with entire accuracy and
lucidity." Wigmore § 2400, at 3. But cf. Calamari & Perillo 333 which suggests that the
confusion stems from differing value judgments.
43. The Supreme Court of California openly acknowledged that its previous decisions
have not been consistent and attempted to clarify the present status of the parol evidence
rule in California. See Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal. 2d 222, 436 P.2d 561, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545
(1968). This decision and the present status of the parol evidence rule in California are
discussed in 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev., supra note 21, at 977-82.
44. Corbin § 573, at 363-64.
45. See, e.g., State Fin. Corp. v. Ballestrini, 111 Conn. 544, 150 A. 700 (1930), where
Williston's test is vocalized but a result more consistent with Corbin's analysis is achieved.
Compare this case with Mitchill v. Lath, 247 N.Y. 377, 160 N.E. 646 (1928), discussed infra
in the text accompanying notes 68-74.
46. For cases involving exceptions to the rule, see, e.g., Gordon v. Witthauer, 258 Iowa
617, 622, 138 N.W.2d 918, 921 (1965) (exception recognized where the oral agreement
"'has been accepted and acted upon by the parties in such a manner as would work a fraud
on either party to refuse to enforce it . . . . '" Id.); Bareham & McFarland, Inc. v. Kane,
228 App. Div. 396, 240 N.Y.S. 123 (4th Dep't 1930) (exception to prove false and fraudulent
statement which induced the contract).
47. A court's dogmatic statement that the parol evidence rule bars the introduction of such
evidence may serve to conceal the fact that the evidence was indeed considered but rejected
as unbelievable. For a discussion of cases which, in Professor Corbin's opinion, fall into this
category see Corbin § 573, at 366 n.8.
48. Hale, The Parol Evidence Rule, 4 Ore. L. Rev. 91, 120 (1925). For a discussion of the
hazards involved in counseling a client in this area of the law see Sweet 1044-45.
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the parol evidence rule.49 They fail to indicate the rational basis for the court's
finding that the writing was intended to be a final and complete expression of
the agreement-an "integration." 50 Exactly how the existence of an integration
is to be determined and what evidence may be considered in making that de-
termination, are the fundamental questions which have created seemingly endless
debate among the commentators and arbitrary and irreconcilable decisions in
the courts.
To bring the conflict into focus it is necessary to concentrate on the major
formulations of the parol evidence rule that have been espoused, for it is with
reference to one or more of them that courts have developd their varying tests
and standards for applying the rule. Although a considerable number of indi-
vidual views have been expressed,5 ' those of Professors Corbin and Williston are
the most significant. They represent the two opposing schools of thought on the
question of "integration"-the existence of which determines the applicability of
the parol evidence rule.
Although there is a rather defined area in which Professors Corbin and
Wiflliston are said to be in substantial accord, 2 this apparent harmony serves
only to mask the basic conflict that exists between them as to the concept of
"total integration." Since the parol evidence rule purports to have no application
unless the writing is integrated, 53 the determination of the existence of an integra-
tion and the procedure by which that determination is to be made are the crucial
factors which regulate and define the rule's scope.
Both Williston and Corbin assert unequivocally that the existence of an in-
tegration depends upon the intent of the parties in reducing their agreement to
writing. 4 Yet, they attach radically different meanings to the word "intent" as
used in this context. "[0] ne [is] determined to seek out the intent of the parties,
49. "Such is the complexity of circumstance and the variety of documentary phraseology,
and so minute the indicia of intent, that one ruling can seldom be of controlling authority
or even of utility for a subsequent one. The opinions of judges are cumbered with citations
of cases which serve no purpose there except to prove what is not disputed,-the general
principle." Wigmore § 2442, at 134-36.
5o. "An agreement is integrated where the parties thereto adopt a writing or aitings
as the final and complete expression of the agreement. An integration is the writing or
writings so adopted." Restatement of Contracts § 228, at 307 (1932). A distinction must be
drawn between a "total integration" which was intended by the parties to be the final and
complete expression of their agreement and a "partial integration" which they intended to
be final but not complete. A "total integration" may be neither contradicted nor supple-
mented; a "partial integration" may not be contradicted but may be supplemented by
evidence of consistent additional terms. See Calamari & Perillo 335.
51. See note 41 supra. For a general discussion see also Murray, The Parol Evidence Rule:
A Clarification, 4 Duquesne L. Rev. 337 (1965); Strahorn, The Unity of the Parol Evidence
Rule, 14 Min L. Rev. 20 (1929).
52. See Calamari & Perillo 334-37.
53. This follows directly from the accepted definition of the rule. See Corbin § 575, at 381;
W1lliston § 631, at 948-49.
54. Williston does so in his section entitled "Integration Depends Upon Intent." Wdiliston
§ 633. Corbin's emphasis upon intent runs throughout his entire discussion. Corbin §§ 573-96.
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the other [speaks] of intent but [refuses] to consider evidence of what the intent
actually was. ' ' 56
B. Corbin's View
When Corbin says that it is impossible to determine whether or not a writing
is an integration without considering the intent of the parties, he means nothing
short of their actual expressed intent. The parties made the agreement; they are
the ones who put that agreement into writing. The parol evidence rule, as Corbin
sees it, exists solely to preserve and protect that written agreement as actually
intended.56 It follows, therefore, that the rule does not apply to the question of
whether the parties assented to the particular terms of the writing as the com-
plete and final expression of their contract. In deciding this issue, "no relevant
evidence, whether parol or otherwise, is excluded."' 7 The court must know all
the facts relevant to the question of whether or not the writing represents the
complete and final agreement of the parties before it can even attempt to
adjudicate their respective rights and obligations under the contract. Only after
the writing is found to be an integration in light of the surrounding circum-
stances and after consideration of all other relevant evidence, does the parol evi-
dence rule come into play to bar variation or contradiction."8 No written docu-
ment-no matter how apparently complete it may be-can prove its own
integration.59
C. Williston's View
Professor Williston also professes to be seeking the intent of the parties.
However, for him "it is not the real intent but the intent expressed or apparent
in the writing which is sought."60 Some courts interpret this to mean that only
55. Calamari & Perillo 339.
56. Dean Wigmore agrees that "intent must be sought where always intent must be
sought ... namely, in the conduct and language of the parties and the surrounding circum-
stances. The document alone will not suffice." Wigmore § 2430, at 98 (emphasis omitted).
However, the similarity between Wigmore and Corbin seems to end here because Wigmore
proceeds to advocate a mechanical approach for determining the intent to integrate. "In
deciding upon this intent, the chief and most satisfactory index for the judge is found in
the circumstance whether or not the particular element of the alleged extrinsic negotiation is
dealt with at all in the writing. If it is . . . dealt with in the writing, then presumably the
writing was meant to represent all of the transaction on that element; if It is not, then
probably the writing was not intended to embody that element of the negotiation." Id. at
98-99 (emphasis omitted).
57. Corbin § 573, at 360. "Until the trial court has found that the writing is an agreed
and accurate integration (whether total or partial), the rule . . . has no application. If that
court has found that an 'integration' exists, it has already found that the contradictory
evidence is untrue; if it has found that the contradictory evidence is true, there is no inte-
gration." Id. § 582, at 264, n.78 (Supp. 1971) (emphasis omitted).
58. Id. § 539, at 77-78.
59. Id. § 573, at 360.
60. Williston § 610, at 503 (footnote omitted). See, e.g., In re Double H. Prods. Corp.,
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the writing itself is to be considered on the question of whether or not an integra-
tion in fact exists.6 ' Technically, this is not Williston's view. For Williston a
writing apparently "complete on its face" generally will be deemed to be a total
integration 62 -the complete embodiment of the rights and obligations of the
parties as to the subject matter covered by the writing-and no parol evidence
will be admitted to contradict that conclusion.63 The writing becomes, for legal
purposes, the sole act of the parties as regards any and all matters up to the time
of integration" and the parol evidence rule presumes that such a writing em-
bodies the entire agreement of the parties.65 Assuming that the writing is ap-
parently complete on its face, Williston would admit no parol evidence to vary
or contradict the terms contained therein unless the subject matter of the alleged
parol agreement is such that "parties, situated as were the ones to the contract,
would naturally and normally" 66 have put it into a separate agreement.67
The case of Mitchlfl v. Lat11 8 provides a good illustration of Williston's ap-
462 F.2d 52, 54-55 (3d Cir. 1972) (the contract is governed by the presumed intent of the
parties).
61. This is the so-called "four corners" test. Nothing outside the four comers of the instru-
ment is to be considered in determining whether it is an integration. See, e.g., Gulf At.
Towing Corp. v. Dickerson, Inc., 271 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1959); Naumberg v. Young, 44
N.J.L. 331 (Sup. Ct 1882); St. Louis-S.F. Ry. v. Humphrey, 446 P.2d 271 (Okla. 1968). But
see Sylvania Elec. Prods. v. United States, 458 F.2d 994 (CL CL 1972); Wigmore § 2431(b).
62. Williston § 633, at 1014-15. But "[wlhat appears to be a complete and binding
integrated agreement may be a forgery, a joke, a sham .... Such invalidating causes need not
and commonly do not appear on the face of the writing." Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, § 240, Comment c, at 160 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1970).
63. Williston § 633, at 1011. See 1 S. Greenleaf, Evidence § 275, at 372 (15th ed. 1892).
64. Williston § 632, at 977. See, e.g., Yams v. Yars, 178 Cal. App. 2d 190, 197, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 50, 55 (2d Dist. 1960); Des Moines v. West Des Moines, 244 Iowa 310, 314-15, 56
N.W.2d 904, 906 (1953).
65. Williston § 631, at 952-53. The language used has run the gamut from "presumes," to
"conclusively presumes," to "assumes" to "considers." See, e.g., Farmers Mut Hail Ins. Co.
v. Fox Turkey Farms, Inc., 301 F.2d 697, 699 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962)
(presumed that the whole agreement was reduced to writing); Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp.
v. Thompson, 273 F.2d 396, 399 (8th Cir. 1959) (conclusively presumed that entire agree-
ment was reduced to writing); Overland Machined Prods., Inc. v. Swingline, Inc., 263 Cal.
App. 2d 642, 69 CaL Rptr. 852 (2d Dist. 1968) (writing considered to contain all terms);
Youngren v. John W. Lloyd Constr. Co., 22 Utah 2d 207, 210, 450 P.2d 985, 987 (1969)
(assumed that prior negotiations are merged).
66. Wiliston § 638, at 1042. "The point is not merely whether the court is convinced that
the parties before it did in fact [make such an oral agreement], but whether parties so
situated generally would or might do so." Id. at 1041 (footnote omitted). The test is one
of inherent probability.
67. If the writing is found to be an integration, parol evidence may still be admissible for
purposes of interpretation in accordance with the standard of limited usage. Williston § 607.
For a general discussion of the role played by interpretation and its interplay with the
parol evidence rule see Calamari & Perillo 345-53.
68. 247 N.Y. 377, 160 N.E. 646 (1928). The facts of the case are used as the basis of an
illustration of Professor Williston's view of integration. Calamari & Perillo 337-39.
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proach to integration. There, the plaintiff's husband entered into a written agree-
ment to purchase certain real property from the defendants. The agreement was
apparently complete on its face in that it contained precise provisions as to the
obligations of each of the parties respecting the sale. 69 Plaintiff alleged, however,
that the written contract was signed in reliance upon the defendants' oral promise
to remove an ice house maintained by them on neighboring property.
Although conceding that such an oral agreement may in fact have been made,
the court stated that this did not of itself make the oral agreement enforceable.
Unless the oral agreement constitutes "a parol collateral contract distinct from
and independent of the written agreement" 70 the parol evidence rule bars its
proof. The court then proceeded to list three conditions that must be met before
such an agreement can be enforced:
(1) the agreement must in form be a collateral one; (2) it must not contradict ex-
press or implied provisions of the written contract; (3) it must be one that parties
would not ordinarily be expected to embody in the writing; or put in another way,
an inspection of the written contract, read in the light of surrounding circumstances
must not indicate that the writing appears 'to contain the engagements of the parties,
and to define the object and measure the extent of such engagement.' 7'
The court found that the alleged oral agreement was too closely related to the
subject matter covered in the writing to be provable.72 Despite the fact that the
oral promise was to remove a structure from land not covered by the written
agreement and that its existence "[was] established by the overwhelming weight
of evidence," 73 it failed to satisfy the third requirement. The court felt that it
was the type of agreement that such parties would normally have included in the
writing. Furthermore, the court intimated that such an oral promise might even
fail to satisfy the second requirement 74 by contradicting definite provisions of the
written contract.
Professor Williston promotes such an approach because he fears that the
parol evidence rule would be emasculated if extrinsic evidence were allowed to
determine the intent to integrate. Allowing the introduction of such evidence
would impair the "practical value" of the rule by reducing it to the level of a
mere presumption rebuttable by proof of any contemporaneous oral agreement by
either party.7 5 If such an approach were followed, the objective certainty
of the parol evidence rule and of the law itself would be subjugated to the
testimony of the parties. The only remaining question would be whether such a
69. 247 N.Y. at 381-82, 160 N.E. at 647.
70. Id. at 380, 160 N.E. at 647. The court cites Williston § 637 in recognizing the difficulty
in drawing the line between them.
71. 247 N.Y. at 381, 160 N.E. at 647. But cf. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 239,
comment c, at 151-52 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1970).
72. 247 N.Y. at 381, 160 N.E. at 647.
73. Id. at 387, 160 N.E. at 649 (Lehman, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 381, 160 N.E. at 647.
75. Williston § 633, at 1014. But see Corbin § 554; Hale, The Parol Evidence Rule, 4
Ore. L. Rev. 91, 123 (1925).
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collateral agreement was actually made and this would be a question for the
jury.76 In light of the purpose that Williston attaches to the parol evidence rule,
such a formulation is understandable, but not convincing. 7 The "intent" Willis-
ton is seeking is the intent expressed by the parties in formalizing their agree-
ment in a written memorial. By that act they have evidenced an intent to be
bound and his parol evidence rule is designed to effectuate that intent and
preserve the integrity of the written instrument. As Williston views the equa-
tion, the degree of commercial certainty to be obtained far outweighs the restric-
tion imposed upon the parties' freedom to contract.78 These policy decisions are
reflected in dicta such as that of the court in Mitchill v. Lath: "We have believed
that the purpose behind the [parol evidence] rule was a wise one not easily to be
abandoned. Notwithstanding injustice here and there, on the whole it works for
good. Old precedents and principles are not to be lightly cast aside unless it is
certain that they are an obstruction under present conditions."-,
Such policy might be acceptable if appearances could be trusted to tell the
entire story. Unfortunately, this is rarely the case. In an era dominated by ad-
hesion contracts and inequality of bargaining power, the agreement as set down in
writing may not express the entire contract of the parties. To blindly enforce it
as written because it is apparently complete may punish those whom the law
should seek to protect.80
As a result, when a parol evidence situation has presented itself, courts have
tried to "find a way around or [looked] for a hole in the legal fence."81 They
have even circumvented the rule by the back door-by resorting to interpretation
in the first instance to determine that the writing is not an integration. 8 - They
76. Williston § 635. The rationale behind this is well expressed in Cargill Comm'n. Co. v.
Swartwood, 159 Minn. 1, 7, 198 N.W. 536, 538 (1924): "Without that rule there would be
no assurance of the enforceability of a written contract. If such assurance were removed
today from our law, general disaster would result, because of the consequent destruction of
confidence.... " See also McCormick, supra note 32.
77. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 240 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1970).
78. WVflliston § 633, at 1014.
79. 247 N.Y. at 380, 160 N.E. at 647.
80. Professors Calamari and Perillo would caution against the assumption that "the parol
evidence rule protects the 'haves' against the 'have nots' .... ." Calamari & Perillo 335 n.10.
However, staunch consumer protection advocates seem to feel that the rule operates to the
disservice of the consumer. See National Consumer Law Center, Model Consumer Credit Act
§§ 1.202, 1.203, 1.204 (1973).
81. Giberson v. First Nat'l Bank, 100 N.J. Eq. 502, 508, 136 A. 323, 325 (Ch. 1927).
82. The absurdity of the situation is demonstrated in that while espousing strict applica-
tion of the rule, certain courts have found the writing ambiguous but only after considering
parol evidence of the meaning attached to the terms by the parties. "[The] fatuity [of the
so-called rule against admitting extrinsic evidence to interpret apparently complete and
unambiguous written instruments] is demonstrated by holdings that the conflicting contentions
of the parties as to the meaning of a written instrument alone supply the ambiguity necessary
to take the rule out of play." Laux v. Freed 53 Cal. 2d 512, 525, 348 P.2d 873, 880, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 265, 272 (1960) (Traynor, J., concurring). See Petroleum Financial Corp. v. Cockburn,
241 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1957).
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have done everything short of acknowledging that the traditional formulation
strictly applied would do more harm than good. 88 The resulting confusion and
conflict, however, have not gone unnoticed.
D. The Uniform Commercial Code
Section 2-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code84 represents a recognition by
its drafters that such conflicting views do exist. It is an attempt to formulate
a succinct and uniform parol evidence rule to be applied at least in sale-of-goods
situations.8 5 More importantly, it is an attempt to come to grips with the root of
the conflict-the problem of total integration. The Code openly rejects Williston's
view8 '6 in favor of a more liberal approach. The official comments to section
2-202 declare, among other things, that evidence of an alleged oral agreement
should be admitted unless the court finds that the "additional terms are such
that... they would certainly have been included in the document .... ."87 Only
then should "evidence of their alleged making . . . be kept from the trier of
fact." 88 The thrust of the Code formulation, therefore, is to make it more difficult
for a court to find that an integration exists by simply referring to the document
itself. In effect it establishes a presumption that the writing is not an integration
83. See note 46 supra. There are numerous law review articles analyzing the application
of the parol evidence rule in various states. See, e.g., Baiat, The Parol Evidence Rule in
Tennessee, 15 Tenn. L. Rev. 773 (1939); Dalzell, Twenty-Five years of Parol Evidence In
North Carolina, 33 N.C.L. Rev. 420 (1955); Degnan, Parol Evidence-The Utah Version, 5
Utah L. Rev. 158 (1956); Moreland, The Parol Evidence Rule in Virginia, 3 Wash. & Lee
L. Rev. 185 (1942) ; Comment, Scope and Operation of the Parol Evidence Rule in Arkansas,
4 Ark. L. Rev. 168 (1950); Comment, The Parol Evidence Rule in Missouri, 27 Mo. L. Rev.
269 (1962); Note, A Critique of the Parol Evidence Rule in Pennsylvania, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev.
703 (1952); Note, Parol Evidence in Wisconsin, 15 Wis. L. Rev. 427 (1940).
84. "Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or
which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of
their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted
by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be
explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by course of performance
(Section 2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have
been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement."
85. That the application of the policy of the Uniform Commercial Code should not be
limited to sale of goods situations but instead should be used as a premise for judicial
reasoning in other areas of the law as well, see Note, The Uniform Commercial Code as a
Premise for Judicial Reasoning, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 880 (1965). See also MeDonough, Tie
Parol Evidence Rule in South Dakota and the Effect of Section 2-202 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 10 S.D.L. Rev. 60 (1965); Note, The Parol Evidence Rule: The Advent of the
Uniform Commercial Code in Iowa, 52 Iowa L. Rev. 512 (1966).
86. See note 70 supra and accompanying text. Corbin asserts that his view is in complete
harmony with that expressed in the Code. Corbin § 573A (Supp. 1971).
87. Uniform Commercial Code §§ 2-202, Comment 3 (emphasis added).
88. Id. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts 88 (1970).
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rebuttable only by evidence that such terms would certainly have been in-
cluded.8 9 The burden is on the party who would seek to invoke the parol evidence
rule and the opposing party will at least be given the opportunity to present his
case to the court.
IV. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IN APPLYMG THE RuLE To THD PARTIs
A. The "Stranger Exception"
The practical difficulties in predicting the application of the parol evidence rule
-stemming from the various formulations of the rule and the differing value
judgments which they reflect-are compounded when the litigation involves a
third party. Since the third party was not a party to the writing, he generally
can not be said to have created or assented to the formal written agreement. He,
therefore, can not be charged with the ignorance or carelessness of the parties
who actually signed the document. 0 Practically, however, he may be just as
prone to perjury as either of the original parties to the writing, since his cause of
action may succeed or fail depending upon the court's determination of the
effect to be given the written instrument. Moreover, the presence of a third
party does not change the writing in any respect. If it is complete on its face, it
remains so regardless of who the parties to the action may happen to be. The
time-worn reasons advanced for the necessity of strictly applying the parol
evidence rule would seem to be equally applicable whether the litigating parties
are the original parties to the writing or an original party and a third person."1
However, a number of courts have hesitated or refused to routinely apply
Williston's strict formulation of the parol evidence rule to certain third parties.
Bell v. Liberty Drug Co.92 is a typical example. There, Liberty purchased a neon
sign from the Bell Corporation pursuant to a written agreement. The contract
provided that Bell was to hang the sign on existing support bars and repaint the
bars. The plaintiff in this case was the president and principal stockholder of Bell.
In an effort to inspect the bars and chains the plaintiff leaned a ladder against
them and climbed the ladder. One of the chains snapped, causing the ladder to
topple, and the plaintiff was injured.93 Defendant Liberty sought to introduce
evidence of a conversation between its president and Bell's salesman to the effect
that if inspection revealed the bars and chains to be unsafe, Bell was to replace
them. Such evidence, if admitted, would have created an issue of fact as to
plaintiff's assumption of the risk. Plaintiff objected to the testimony on the
ground that it tended to vary the terms of the written agreement which was
89. The only other exception would be where there is dear evidence that the parties
intended the writing to be an integration. An integration or merger clause may have this
effect. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts 88 (1970).
90. Central Coal & Coke Co. v. George S. Good & Co., 120 F. 793, 799 (8th Cir. 1903).
The original parties should not "by their ignorance, carelessness, or fraud estop the litigants
from proving the truth." Id.
91. See notes 21-25 supra and accompanying text.
92. 16 App. Div. 2d 809, 228 N.Y.S.2d 846 (2d Dep't 1962).
93. Id. at 810, 228 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
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complete on its face and obligated Bell only to repaint the bars. At the trial the
objection was sustained and the parol evidence was excludedY4 The Appellate
Division reversed on the ground that the plaintiff was a "stranger" to the con-
tract and therefore could not invoke the parol evidence rule. The court stated:
The parol evidence rule does not apply where, as here, the controversy is not between
the parties to the contract or their privies; that rule may not be invoked by a
stranger to the writing . . . . Despite plaintiff's status as president and principal
stockholder of the Bell corporation, he and it are distinct legal entities; vis-h-vis the
Liberty corporation he was not one of the contracting parties; he was in the same
legal position as any stranger.95
If the plaintiff in this case is a stranger to the contract, who are the parties and
privies to it? Even if Bell (the plaintiff) and the corporation which bears his
name are distinct legal entities, was not Mr. Bell acting as an agent of the
corporation when he attempted to inspect the bars? He could hardly be classified
as an independent contractor. Why then did he not qualify as a privy, 0 since his
rights were derived from and dependent upon those of the Bell corporation?
The court simply felt that the oral evidence deserved to be considered in this
particular case. If the parol evidence rule had been strictly applied, the evidence
would not have been admissible since, as the trial court found, it tended to vary
or contradict the terms of a written agreement which was apparently complete on
its face, i.e., integrated. Instead, the court resorted to the so-called "stranger
exception. '9 7
As this case indicates, the boundaries of the "stranger" category are neither
defined nor rigid. Rather, "[t]he courts . . . apply this exception within certain
limits to a varying class of persons to the end that justice may be effected between
parties."98 Its existence and the "flexibility of expression"90 that it affords has
led to its gradual extension. 100
Such decisions, however, are in conflict with the legal theory which these same
courts have quoted and purported to apply in actions between the original parties
to a written agreement. The result is that even the commentators seem to be in
94. Id., 228 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
95. Id. (citations omitted).
96. "A 'privy' has been defined as'... one who has succeeded to some right or obligation
which one of the parties to the act derived through the act or incurred under it.'" Fontenot
v. Fontenot, 175 So. 2d 910, 912 (La. Ct. App. 1965), quoting Commercial Germania Trust &
Say. Bank v. White, 145 La. 54, 56, 81 So. 753, 755 (1919).
97. For a general discussion of the stranger exception see Harris, Does the Parol Evidence
Rule Apply When One of the Parties to the Controversy is a Stranger to the Contract?, 22
Ill. L. Rev. 274 (1927).
98. Harris, supra note 97, at 279. However, Harris makes it clear that "[wlhenever a third
person is claiming a right under and through a party to the contract the strict rule does and
should apply and he cannot be said to be a stranger to the contract." Id.
99. Id.
100. The mere fact that certain courts recognize a broad exception for third party




disagreement as to the status of the parol evidence rule in third party situa-
tions. l°0 The question remains: can the parol evidence rule be invoked by or
against a third party to a written contract?
The answer to that question seems to depend primarily upon two factors: 1)
whether the particular court favors application of Professor Corbin's or Pro-
fessor Williston's approach in contests between the original parties; and 2) the
relative importance that the court attaches to the policy which underscores the
particular formulation of the rule chosen. When the rule as formulated comes
into conflict with what the court conceives to be "substantial justice" in any
particular case, it must be justified in light of some greater good to be served or
give way to an exception to, or limitation upon, the scope of its application .102
At least as far as a third party stranger is concerned, there now seems to be some
authority that the goals to be served by strict application of the rule are out-
weighed by the injustice that would result.10 3 Perhaps by focusing upon this
so-called "exception" courts and commentators might have to consciously come to
grips with the reason for its existence; in so doing they might even conclude that
it is not just another exception to the parol evidence rule, but a direct reflection
of the inadequacy of the rule as traditionally understood.
It should be noted at this point that not all courts which routinely apply the
strict formulation of the rule explicitly recognize an exception for third party
strangers. Some make no distinctions and purport to apply the rule regardless of
who the parties to the action may be or the nature of the rights they are seeking
to enforce. 04 Others state that the rule is applicable to the parties, their privies
and those who seek to enforce rights derived from the written instrument.loa
These two versions appear to be different ways of saying the same thing. How-
ever, the second formulation may turn out to be less broad than the first because
101. See, e.g., J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 45 (1970) ; Williston § 647.
Calamari, Perillo and Wflliston agree that the parol evidence rule should apply to third
parties as well as to the original parties if the writing is integrated. However, none of their
commentaries appears to recognize the conflict that exists and, therefore, it is impossible to
determine the status of the parol evidence rule in third party situations from their discussions.
102. For a discussion of the need for an exception or restatement of the parol evidence
rule to do justice to strangers see Harris, supra note 97.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., United States v. Ivey, 414 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1969). "It has sometimes been
broadly stated that the parol evidence rule has no application to any save the parties to the
instrument. However, as when here the contract is executed as the final embodiment of the
agreement ... the law and not their wish or understanding must control its legal effect . .. .
Id. at 203 (citations omitted); Oxford Commercial Corp. v. Landau, 12 N.Y.2d 362, 190
N.E.2d 230, 239 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1963). "It is too well settled for citation that, if a written
agreement contains no obvious or latent ambiguities, neither the parties nor their privies may
testify to what the parties meant but failed to state." Id. at 365, 190 N.E.2d at 231, 239
N.Y.S.2d at 867. The third parties involved here would seem to fit more neatly into the
category of strangers rather than privies. See text accompanying notes 166-71 infra.
105. See, e.g., Clark v. United States, 341 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1965); Willard
Storage Battery Co. v. Palmer, 200 Iowa 1020, 205 N.W. 976 (1925); Anders v. State, 42
Misc. 2d 276, 248 N.Y.S.2d 4 (Ct. CL 1964).
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the court is bound to determine the relationship of the third person to the original
parties and the relationship of the third person's rights to the written instrument.
If a court wants to justify the admissibility of parol evidence in a particular case,
however, it will find a way around the rule regardless of how it defines the scope
of its application.
The emphasis at this point is upon those decisions which recognize the need for
an exception or at least make some attempt to treat third parties differently. As
regards those decisions that apply the rule strictly and consistently in all cases,
all that will be said at this point is that their consistency, however admirable,
is oftentimes achieved at the expense of innocent litigants.' 00
B. Corbin's View-The Rule and Third Parties
It is universally agreed that the parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive law
and not an exclusionary rule of evidence.' 0 7 As such, its role is to prescribe the
legally enforceable contractual obligations of the parties. Once that has been done,
not even a third party should be allowed to question those obligations. 108
However, the disputed question as to just how those obligations are to be de-
termined remains unanswered. 109 The way in which a court approaches that
question will dictate whether the rule comes into play. At that point the rule
must either be applied or its non-application must be justified.
If the court accepts Professor Corbin's view in its entirety, including his
liberal reading of the integration requirement and his emphasis upon the actual
intent of the parties, there is no need for it to differentiate between the original
parties and any third person. The identity of the parties to the action becomes
irrelevant. The rights and obligations which the contracting parties actually
intended to set down in the written memorial become determinative in all cases.
Once the court determines the actual intent of the agreement, no one will be
allowed to introduce extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict its terms. A com-
pletely integrated written instrument should be just as invulnerable to parol
testimony as against third parties as it is against the contracting parties them-
selves." 0 "[I] f the rule is correctly stated and understood,""' no other conclu-
sion can be reached. For "[i] f two parties have by a complete written integration
discharged and nullified antecedent negotiations between them, they are so dis-
106. Corbin § 596.
107. Id. § 573, at 357-58; Williston § 631. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
108. Akamine & Sons, Ltd. v. American Sec. Bank, 50 Hawaii 304, 310, 440 P.2d 262, 266
(1968).
109. See notes 45-50 supra and accompanying text. The determination of those obligations
depends upon the finding of an integration and the weight to be given to the actual Intent
of the parties in making that finding.
110. This principle was well stated in Atlantic N. Airlines, Inc., v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J.
293, 96 A.2d 652 (1953): "If there be a complete written integration, the rule is the same no
matter who asserts or denies the release; the intention of the parties is equally binding upon
strangers to the instrument. Compare Essington v. Parrish, 164 F.2d 725 (7th Cir. 1947)."
Id. at 296, 96 A.2d at 655-56.
111. Corbin § 596, at 572.
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charged and nullified without regard to whoever may be asserting or denying
the fact.' 1 2 If the court would concern itself with determining the actual intent
of the parties and seek to effectuate that intent in all cases, there would be no
need for it to distinguish between litigants in any particular case. The sole condi-
tion precedent to application of the rule would be the existence of an inte-
gration.113
C. Estoppel as a Basis for the Stranger Exception
Not all the courts which cite Corbin are willing to seek out the actual intent
of the parties.11 4 Rather than apply Williston's view, however, such courts state
that the parol evidence rule does not apply to a stranger to the writing, regard-
less of whether the writing is integrated. While disagreeing with the analysis
upon which such decisions are predicated, Corbin would agree that such an
approach suffices in most instances to achieve what he views as the correct
result. Such decisions "can usually be sustained on the ground that the evidence
tended to show that the integration was not complete and should have been
heard and weighed even as between the parties to the writing." 115 In many such
instances, "the parol evidence held admissible on this theory might have been
properly admitted on other grounds,""16 without the necessity of any critical
reference to the parties to the action. In some cases, such evidence would seem
to have been admissible under "anybody's" parol evidence rule."17 In others, the
writing was apparently complete on its face and dealt with the subject matter
of the alleged oral agreement so that only under Professor Corbin's theory of
integration would the evidence have been admissible in all cases." 8 Yet, in both
112. Id.
113. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Loria's Garage, Inc. v. Smith, 49 N.J. Super. 242, 139 A.2d 430 (Super. Ct.
1958). Here the defendant lessor attempted to prove by parol that a lease held by the plaintiff,
assignee of the lease, did not cover certain premises; this despite the fact that the area in
question was expressly included in the written lease. The court refused to consider evidence of
the actual intent of the parties, finding the instrument to be a total integration. The court
then cited Wiliston and Corbin for the proposition that a completely integrated instrument is
just as invulnerable to parol evidence as between a party and a third person as it is between
the parties themselves. The statement is accurate, but application of the parol evidence rule
without considering the actual intent of the parties to integrate takes the heart out of
Corbin's viewpoint.
115. Corbin § 596, at 575-76.
116. Natrona Power Co. v. Clark, 31 Wyo. 284, 298, 225 P. 586, 589 (1924).
117. See, e.g., Great W. Cas. Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 358 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 19656)
(contract was ambiguous); Fuller v. Fried, 57 N.M. 824, 224 N.W. 668 (1929) (court here
could have admitted parol evidence on question of whether or not a contract existed).
118. See, e.g., Smith v. Commissioner, 324 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1963) (parol evidence rule
held not applicable to Commissioner so that he could show oral stipulation between taxpayer
and another); Stem v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1943) (Commissioner who was
not a party, was permitted to go behind the written contract in order to discover true
facts); Fontenot v. Fontenot, 175 So. 2d 910 (La. Ct. App. 1965) ; Strawbridge & Clothier v.
Garment Mfrs., Inc. 189 Pa. Super. 43, 149 A.2d 471 (1959) (court held that plaintiff was a
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situations, courts have laid particular stress upon the fact that one of the litigants
was a stranger to the contract and have justified non-application of the parol
evidence rule on that ground. No attempt was made to come to grips with the
question of whether the evidence was actually barred by the parol evidence rule.
It may well be that had the suit been between the original parties to the writing,
the evidence would have been excluded. This is not to intimate that certain
courts do not understand the workings of the parol evidence rule. It is just that
they seem to approach the writing with a different attitude when a stranger is
involved. As Professor Corbin noted, "there is a definite tendency to relax the
operation of the parol evidence rule' when a stranger to the writing is involved." I D
This tendency seems to reflect a deeply rooted though oftentimes unexpressed
belief that "the parol evidence rule rests basically on estoppel." 120 If this is
actually the case, then it would not be surprising that, in an attempt to hold
the original parties strictly accountable for their conduct as expressed in writing,
a court might exclude parol evidence even though it would be theoretically ad-
missible. The reverse seems to be true when strangers are involved. Rather than
attempt to justify the admission of extrinsic evidence in light of the parol evi-
dence rule, courts have been quick to state that the rule does not apply and that
a stranger may go behind the letter of the instrument to prove the true facts.12 1
However, it is generally accepted that, in litigation between an original party
to the contract and a stranger, if the stranger is allowed to enter parol testimony
to show that the writing was not intended to be complete, the original party
may do likewise.122 This may appear to be contradictory in light of the hypothe-
sis that the rule is based upon estoppel, but on closer scrutiny the apparent
contradiction disappears. The strict formulation of the parol evidence rule is
designed to prevent the parties who assented to and signed the agreement from
attempting to contradict or alter the terms of that agreement as written. The
law does not deny that contractors oftentimes fail to put their entire agreements
into writing. What the parol evidence rule attempts to do, if the estoppel theory
is accurate, is to issue a warning: if contractors are so trusting or so gullible
as to sign what appears to be a complete written document without first making
certain that it accurately reflects all the terms of their agreement, they do so at
third party creditor beneficiary and as such not precluded by the parol evidence rule from
showing the circumstances and the true intent).
119. Corbin § 596, at 576.
120. Root v. John T. Robinson Co., 55 F.2d 303, 304 (D. Mass. 1931).
121. See cases cited note 117 supra. In Metz v. Lane Chair Rental, Inc., 16 Misc. 2d
735, 181 N.Y.S.2d 740 (Sup. Ct. 1958), aff'd, 11 App. Div. 2d 741, 204 N.Y.S.2d 636 (2d
Dep't 1960), after stating its finding of fact as to the relationship of the parties, the court
declared that "[ilncidentally, the parol evidence rule does not apply in this case. That rule
only applies between the parties to the writing." Id. at 736, 181 N.Y.S.2d at 742 (citations
omitted).
122. See Worcester Felt Pad Corp. v. Tucson Airport Authority, 233 F.2d 44 (9th Cir.
1956). "The rule excluding parol evidence which may vary a written instrument applies
between parties to the instrument, but in a dispute between a party to the instrument and
a stranger, either may give testimony differing from the contents thereof." Id. at 51. But see
text accompanying note 144 infra.
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their own risk.las The law will not allow them to vary or contradict the written
terms when performance of that contract is at issue. However, the reality may
be that the parties did make a collateral oral agreement which both of them
recognize as an integral part of the contract. To allow a stranger to that agree-
ment to invoke the parol evidence rule to bar an original party from showing
that the writing was not intended to be complete, might make it possible for
the third person to use the rule to create a right which neither of the con-
tracting parties intended him to have. It is one thing for a court to estop the
original parties from denying or varying the terms of the writing inter sese
since they dealt with one another and should have been on their guard; it is
quite another for a court to prohibit an original party from proving the actual
agreement when a stranger seeks to take advantage of the apparent letter of
the writing. In short, the estoppel must be reciprocal -.12 4
D. Williston's View-The Rule and Parties, Privies and Those Claiming
Rights Under the Contract
The real area of confusion is that "grey area" where the third person is neither
a party nor a stranger, but may somehow be in privity or seeking to enforce a
right derived from the writing.'2 5 Before the parol evidence rule can be applied
in such a situation, those courts which attempt to follow Williston's approach
must make some subtle and fundamental distinctions as to the relationship of
the litigating parties vis-&-vis the written contract. It is in this area that the
justice and consistency of this approach becomes suspect.
According to Williston, "'the weight of authority' "'0 is "that the parol evi-
dence rule is applicable only to the parties to a contract and their privies and
does not apply to third persons, or applies to them only when they seek to enforce
rights under the contract." 27 Any categorical exception as far as Williston is
concerned, goes much too far. "[W ] here the issue in dispute, even between third
parties, is what are the obligations of A and B to one another, and those obliga-
tions are stated in a written contract, the parol evidence rule is applicable."'la
123. See, e.g., Enos v. Leediker, 214 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948). "'A contractor
must stand by the words of his contract; and if he will not mad what he signs, he alone is
responsible for his omission.'" Id. at 696 (citation omitted).
124. Cunningham v. Day Bros. Eng'r Co., 55 A.2d 89 (D.C. Mlun. CL App. 1947).
125. As has been noted, the courts will sometimes extend the stranger exception to parties
who are not, strictly speaking, strangers. See discussion in text accompanying notes 90-100
supra.
126. Williston § 647, at 1155 (footnote omitted).
127. Id. at 1154 (footnote omitted). See American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Nicholas, 124
F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1941); Indianapolis Glove Co. v. United States, 96 F.2d 816 (7th Cir.
1938); Central Coal & Coke Co. v. George S. Good & Co., 120 F. 793 (8th Cir. 1903).
128. Wlliston § 647, at 1161 (footnote omitted). Likewise, Dean Wigmore would argue
that the parol evidence rule bars third persons from introducing extrinsic utterances "for the
very purpose for which the writing has superseded them as the legal act." Wigmore § 2246,
at 150 (emphasis omitted). Wigmore stated that while "(ilt is commonly said that the
Parol Evidence rule . . .is binding upon only those persons who are parties to the docu-
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Again, this statement, in and of itself, appears to authorize the same result as
Professor Corbin's view. However, the apparent harmony disappears when one
recalls that Williston and Corbin advocate radically different tests for deter-
mining the existence of an integration upon which application of the parol
evidence rule depends.'2 There is no dispute that under any view third parties
can show by extrinsic evidence that facts as recited in an apparently complete
and integrated agreement are not accurately stated.13 0 Likewise, "if a transaction
is in fraud of the rights of third persons, it may be shown by parol that the
written contract is a scheme ... to defraud them, though in an action between
the parties the writing might be taken at its face value.''"13 These are virtually
the only situations in which Williston would give preferential treatment to third
parties. As he explains it:
It must be remembered that the written contract represents the truth and the whole
truth of the contractual obligations of A and B in whatever way and between what-
ever parties an inquiry as to such obligations may become important. To admit parol
evidence to the contrary which would not be admitted as between the parties ...is
to permit facts to be shown which have no relevancy to the issue of what is the con-
tract between A and B.132
The parol evidence rule presumes that the writing is the whole of the contract.
Such a presumption is anathema to Professor Corbin. To him, no evidence is
irrelevant on the issue of the intended contract between A and B. Many courts,
however, fail to recognize this distinction.
Commissioner v. Dwight's Estate3 s is an illustration of a case which cites
Corbin for the proposition that the rule applies to third persons but reaches a
result inconsistent with his analysis. Moreover, Professor Williston used this
case in his treatise as an illustration of how the parol evidence rule should be
applied to third parties. It is, therefore, worth examining in some detail.
The decedent established a trust fund in the amount of $200,000 with the
income to be paid to his wife during her lifetime "'for her support and mainte-
nance." '1 A letter written by the decedent before execution of the trust agree-
ment clearly indicated that his motive was to provide the wife with sufficient
funds to meet the living and hospital expenses of her two invalid daughters. The
ment," and "suffices in most instances to reach correct results ... it is not sound on principle."
Id. at 149 (emphasis omitted).
129. See notes 56-57 supra and accompanying text.
130. E.g., Williston § 647, at 1159. "[lit does not follow from the parol evidence rule
'that the written contract between A and B, which is conclusive as to them, must be of
necessity so, as to the proof of any rights or claims of A against C merely because they grow
out of the same business,' nor even as to partners on the same side of an integration in
disputes inter sese." Id. (footnotes omitted). The court must, therefore, of necessity make
distinctions as to the relationship of the parties to the contract and as to the rights which they
are seeking to enforce.
131. Id. (footnotes omitted).
132. Id. at 1163 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
133. 205 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 871 (1953).
134. Id. at 299.
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question to be resolved was whether the income from the trust was taxable. If it
was "intended" for the support of the wife, it was; if it was for the support of
the two invalid daughters, it was not.13 5 The taxpayer attempted to introduce
the letter into evidence on the ground that the parol evidence rule was not
applicable in a controversy involving a stranger to the writing such as the Com-
missioner.138 Citing Corbin, Williston and Wigmore, the court stated:
[T]his is too broad a statement of the rule, for a stranger to an instrument may not in
every case vary its terms by parole evidence.... And where the issue in dispute is
the legal obligation of the parties to the agreement, the writing must be taken as the
full expression of that legal relationship (assuming that the parties intended the
writing to be an integration of the complete contract). 37
The court concluded that the trust indenture was an integration and that the
letter evidencing the decedent's intent was not admissible to vary or contradict
it. Moreover, the court found that the rights of the wife were so bound up in
the written document that the parol evidence rule would not permit her to go
behind the instrument to prove the true intent. It noted:
The trust indenture here created a legal obligation on the part of the trustee to pay
the income to the settlor's wife for her 'support and maintenance.' Although strictly
speaking the wife was not a party to the agreement, it is to her that the obligation
is owed and only she may enforce it .... Her rights are entirely dependent on the
legal effect of the trust indenture.138
Professor Corbin took issue with this decision and the court's reference to his
treatise as support for its conclusion. "[T]he trust indenture was a donation; and
the intention of the settlor alone was the decisive matter. Neither § 596 [the
section of Corbin's treatise cited by the court] nor any other section is authority
for holding that the letter was not admissible to prove that intention . . .. o
Corbin's point may be that the trust agreement was not a contractual writing
and that, therefore, the parol evidence rule had no applicability. Regardless, the
letter should have been admissible as bearing upon the question of the settlor's
intent to make the indenture the final and complete repository of his intention.
The letter did not in fact vary any of the terms of the trust agreement vis-a-vis
the trustee. The letter did not change the person to whom the income from the
135. Id. at 300.
136. The taxpayer relied upon Brassert v. Clark, 162 F.2d 967, 973-74 (2d Cir. 1947);
Stern v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1943); Folinsbe v. Sawyer, 157 N.Y. 196,
199, 51 N.E. 994 (1898), for authority that the parol evidence rule could not be invoked by
the Commissioner. The court countered by saying that "a stranger to an instrument may not
in every case vary its terms by parole evidence." 205 F.2d at 301, citing Funk v. Commissioner,
185 F.2d 127, 129 n.3 (3d Cir. 1950) ; Pugh v. Commissioner, 49 F.2d 76, 79 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, Pugh v. Burnet, 284 U.S. 642 (1931); Allen v. Ruland, 79 Conn. 405, 65 A. 138
(1906). Given the conflicting authority, the taxpayer could hardly be blamed for not being
certain of his rights.
137. 205 F.2d at 301.
138. Id. (citations omitted).
139. Corbin § 596, at 578.
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trust was to be paid. It merely stated the purpose for which the income was to
be used. This was solely within the discretion of the decedent.
The court here applied the parol evidence rule because it determined that the
wife was seeking to vary the terms of a right derived directly from the written
instrument. 140 Professor Williston is in complete agreement.
The next question, however, is would the parol evidence rule apply had the
daughters sought to enforce the trust indenture in accordance with the intent
expressed in the letter? They would not be seeking to enforce any right derived
directly from the written instrument. Rather, their rights would be derived from
the letter which in turn reflected the decedent's intent in creating the trust,
Would this be claiming a right derived from or under the written document?
An affirmative answer would seem to be required because without the instrument
there would be no trust; however, it is impossible to predict how this or any
other court would decide that question. The further removed the third person
happens to be from the original parties to the writing with respect to the nature
of the rights that he is seeking to enforce, the more subtle are the distinctions
that must be made and the more confused and seemingly arbitrary the decisions
become.
V. THn PARTIES AND RELEASES
The invocation and application of the parol evidence rule in litigation in-
volving third parties and releases 141 highlights the confusion and injustice that
may result when the actual intention of the contracting parties is subjugated
to such artificial distinctions.
"A release, by its own operation, extinguishes a pre-existing right, and so is a
contractual writing within the general rule excluding parol or extrinsic evidence
to contradict or otherwise vary its terms .... ,142 In situations involving third
parties to a release, different courts have held the parol evidence rule both
applicable and inapplicable to determine the same issues: persons covered by
the release; the subject matter of the release; and the extent of the loss or
injury suffered.143 Conflicting authority may even be cited as to whether parol
evidence may be introduced by third parties to vary or contradict the terms of
the release, and whether an original party in the same case may do likewise.1 44
As one commentator has noted, "[a]lthough it does not appear to have been
explicitly recognized, many courts have, as a matter of fact, made deep inroads
140. 205 F.2d at 301.
141. A release is the relinquishment, concession or giving up of a right, claim or privilege
by or against a stranger to the contract." Id. (footnote omitted). But see Adams v. Camden
Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 15 N.J. Misc. 48, 188 A. 913 (Camden County Ct. C.P. 1936),
rev'd on other grounds, 121 NJ.L. 389, 2 A.2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
142. J. Clevenger, Applied Law, Parol Evidence § 1646, at 1664 (1928).
143. 13 A.L.R.3d 317-18. (1967)
144. Id. at 317. "[Ilt has been announced broadly that the rule that the terms of a
written contract cannot be altered or contradicted by parol evidence cannot be invoked either
by or against a stranger to the contract." Id. But see Adams v. Camden Safe Deposit & Trust
Co., 15 N.J. Misc. 48, 188 A. 913 (Camden County Ct. C.P. 1936), rev'd on other grounds,
121 N.J.L. 389, 2 A.2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
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on the parol evidence rule in dealing with releases of claims for personal injury
in cases where the injuries turned out to be more serious than originally con-
templated."'145 This appears to be an attempt to avoid the harsh results of an
overly strict rule without explicitly admitting that rule's fault.
The lack of uniformity caused by the rule in release situations involving third
parties can be demonstrated by briefly examining the leading decisions in Massa-
chusetts and New York. In Johnson v. Von Scholtey,140 the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court held that parol evidence was admissible to prove the intent
of the original parties to a purported "release" with reference to a non-party
joint tortfeasor because the document in question was found to be merely a
"covenant not to sue."'1 47 Here, defendant and a railroad company were joint
tortfeasors, and plaintiff gave to the railroad company a document releasing it
from liability. Plaintiff's instructions to his attorney as to reservation of rights
against defendant were disputed, and the trial court, relying on the parol evi-
dence rule, excluded extrinsic evidence bearing upon that issue.148 The court
reversed a jury verdict for the plaintiff, maintaining that the extrinsic evidence
should have been admitted by the trial court not only because defendant was
not a party or privy,149 but also because the document itself was a covenant
not to sue rather than a release which would have operated to discharge defen-
dant as well as the railroad company.150 Richardson points out that at common
law, "[a] lthough a release or discharge of one of a number of joint tort-feasors,
prior to obtaining judgment against them, operates as a release of all, if such
release contains a reservation of rights against the others, it will be construed
to be simply a covenant not to sue the one nominally released, and the liability
of the others will not be extinguished thereby.' 1 5 1 It is possible that the court
in Johnson found the release to be a covenant not to sue on the basis of extrinsic
evidence which indicated an intent to include language of reservation, and then
justified the admission of the extrinsic evidence on the ground that the document
was a covenant not to sue. In any event, the court seemingly used its power of
interpretation as a back door to get around the parol evidence problem. By inter-
pretation it determined that the release was not an integrated contract. The
court also employed the non-parties or privies argument.152 Only by such reason-
ing could the court avoid the strict mandate of the parol evidence rule.15a
145. Havighurst, Principles of Construction and the Parol Evidence Rule as Applied to
Releases, 60 Nw. U.L. Rev. 599, 600 (1966) (footnote omitted).
146. 218 Mass. 454, 106 N.E. 17 (1914).
147. Id. at 457, 106 N.E. at 17.
148. Id. at 455-56, 106 N.E. at 17.
149. Id. at 457, 106 N.E. at 17.
150. Id. Furthermore, the court seems to disregard any distinction between the parol
evidence problem and the interpretation problem, and in effect interprets the document right
out of the parol evidence arena.
151. W. Richardson, The Law of Contracts § 344, at 289 (5th ed. 1940).
152. See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
153. The court's reliance on the "covenant not to sue" gambit, would apparently have re-
ceived approbation from no less a defender of the doctrine than Williston, who, while decrying
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The same court, however, held in a later case, Muse v. DeVito,15 4 that a
similar document was a release and that where a "release is absolute and un-
conditional, it must be given its full effect, and cannot be varied by parol
evidence introduced to show that the plaintiff intended to reserve whatever
rights she had against this defendant [a third party to the release]."1 5' The
court distinguished Johnson on the ground that the earlier case had involved a
covenant not to sue, which did not operate to discharge the cause of action as
did the release in this case.156 The court apparently either disregarded the
premise that where a suit involves non-parties and non-privies extrinsic evidence
will be admissible,1 7 or it proceeded on the premise that non-parties could use
extrinsic evidence, without extending that privilege to original parties to the
document in the same action. 8 Furthermore, the court found the document to
be a release, and not a covenant not to sue, as a "matter of construction,"'15
without specifying why the document here was more of a release than the
Johnson document had been. "[T]he precedents on this point cannot be recon-
ciled,"'' 6 and litigants are often left to predict at their peril which way the
courts will turn next.
The New York courts have drawn even finer distinctions in release situa-
tions. In Williams v. Fisher,'6' it was declared that "[t]he rule prohibiting
the reception of parol evidence .. .does not apply .. . to a stranger to the
contract."' 62 This unqualified acceptance of the stranger exception is contrary
to both Corbin's and Williston's views.16 3
In Cahill v. Regan,'" judge Fuld, writing for a unanimous court, declared that
a general release was not conclusive where it could be shown that the parties
intended otherwise. Here plaintiff's testator, who manufactured cans, had em-
ployed defendant as a manager and designer. Defendant left the concern after
three years and brought an action to replevy some machinery whose ownership
was in doubt. The parties exchanged general releases as an outcome of this
action. It was later discovered that defendant bad, while working for the con-
the third party exception to the parol evidence rule in release situations, states, "perhaps the
cases might have been well decided on the ground that the so-called releases when interpreted
as a whole were merely covenants not to sue . . . ." Williston § 647, at 1167.
154. 243 Mass. 384, 137 N.E. 730 (1923).
155. Id. at 389, 137 N.E. at 731.
156. Id.
157. A justification used by the Johnson court. See discussion in text accompanying note
152 supra.
158. Such procedure appears to give the non-party an unfair advantage. See note 144
supra. Perhaps the basis for this rests in estoppel. See text accompanying notes 123-24 supra.
The estoppel, however, should be reciprocal. See Cunningham v. Day Bros. Eng'r Co., 55 A.2d
89 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1947).
159. 243 Mass. at 385, 137 N.E. at 731.
160. Havighurst, supra note 145 at 624. See also Wigmore § 2446.
161. 8 Misc. 314, 28 N.Y.S. 739 (N.Y. County Ct. C.P. 1894).
162. Id. at 315, 28 N.Y.S. at 739.
163. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
164. 5 N.Y.2d 292, 157 N.E.2d 905, 184 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1959).
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cern, designed an ammunition cannister and applied for a patent. Plaintiff was
allowed by the court to show that the general releases exchanged after the
replevin action were not intended to cover plaintiff's right to the design."
In a later case, Oxford Comnmercial Corp. v. Landau,"" a release was given
by a corporation to a director who had fraudulently diverted funds. The release
specifically listed several named parties who were covered by it, and contained
language to the effect that the release was general. The court held the document
to be a good defense to a later action by the corporation against several ac-
countants alleged to have been involved in the fraud but who had not been
specifically listed as covered by the release. In his opinion Judge Fuld stated
that "the very definiteness of the language employed concerning the parties
to be relieved of liability... differentiate [s] the present from cases such as...
Cahill v. Regan."'167 It was found that the release in question was an "integrated
agreement... containing provisions quite unlike the stereotyped verbiage found
in the usual standard general release .... ,"1 18 The corporation was precluded by
the court from introducing parol evidence to show an intention to limit the release
to the named parties. Thus, it appears that after Oxford,0 9 if a standard form
is used it may be attacked with extrinsic evidence, while any other specie of
release which is at all specific as to parties covered will be held to be truly
general 70 once found to be an integration,' 7 ' and will, in such cases, be un-
assailable through the use of parol evidence. In this instance, then, the New York
court accepts Corbin's approach.
The intra-jurisdictional confusion reflected by the Massachusetts and New
York decisions is mirrored and multiplied when one becomes concerned with
any inter-jurisdictional problem.'1 2 While some guidance may be afforded by a
recent Supreme Court ruling'13 in a multi-party and multi-state antitrust action
165. Id. at 299, 157 N.E2d at 509-10, 184 N.Y.S.2d at 354.
166. 12 N.Y.2d 362, 190 N.E.2d 230, 239 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1963).
167. Id. at 366, 190 N.E.2d at 231, 239 N.YS.2d at 867 (citations omitted) (italics
added).
168. Id., 190 N.E2d at 231-32, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 867. The court speaks of the problem of
parol evidence and the related problem of interpretation in the same breath, with no attempt
at differentiation. The courts' powers to interpret the documents in question have been used
at times as a means of obviating a parol evidence problem, without a distinction between
these issues ever being drawn. See note 150 supra. The line of demarcation between the parol
evidence rule and interpretation has been further blurred by the recent Restatement. See
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 240, comment a (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1970).
169. The harsh effects of this case have been statutorily remedied in New York. N.Y.
Gen. Oblig. Law § 15-108 (McKinney Supp. 1972). The provision limits the effect of a release
or covenant not to sue the named tortfeasors to the extent that the one released did not
satisfy it. Id.
170. But see note 169 supra.
171. See text accompanying notes 53-83 supra for a discussion of the confusion over the
requisites for an integration. See also J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts § 41 (1970).
172. See, e.g., Atlantic N. Airlines v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293, 96 A.2d 652 (1953) ; Denver
& R.G.R.R. v. Sullivan, 21 Colo. 302, 41 P. 591 (1895).
173. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 US. 321 (1971).
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to the effect that the parol evidence rule applies only to original parties to a
release, it seems likely that the majority of state courts will remain hopelessly
irreconciled on this question. 174
More significantly, the general confusion surrounding the application of the
rule to third parties is not obviated by such language. Rather, such a decision
merely adds one more irreconcileable precedent to an already overcrowded list.
VI. CONCLUSION
"[The use of fictions] today serves only to obfuscate what should be clear.' 7 6
The parol evidence rule as formulated by Professor Williston and applied by
various courts is such a fiction. While professing to seek the actual intent of the
parties with respect to the question of integration, in reality it is primarily con-
cerned with the form in which their agreement is expressed.
The merit of this rule supposedly lies in its objective certainty and simplicity
of application. However, existing case law demonstrates that the rule's applica-
tion is anything but simple or certain. Moreover, its existence has neither served
to create commercial certainty nor fostered reliance upon written documents. In
many cases it serves to frustrate rather than preserve contractual agreements; it
has made exceptions, rather than uniformity of application, the general rule.
The status of the parol evidence rule in third-party situations highlights the
resulting confusion and contradiction. The stranger exception and the distinctions
that must be made as to the relationship of a third party to the original parties
to the contract and as to the nature of the rights that the third party is seeking
to enforce are arbitrary and unnecessary.
If the parol evidence rule has any value at all, it lies in the preservation of
fully integrated written documents. The intent to integrate can not be separated
from the contract-making process which precedes and gives life to the written
agreement.
By starting at the beginning-the contract-making process-rather than at
the end-the written form in which the agreement is expressed-there will be
no need to distinguish between litigants or to strain the facts in an effort to
circumvent the application of the parol evidence rule. The aim in every case will
be to determine the actual agreement of the parties. If the writing represents the
true and complete agreement of the parties, it will be enforced as written; if it
does not, neither an original party, a third person nor the law, will be unjustly
prejudiced by presentation of the actual facts.
In short, "[t]he law should seek the truth or the subjective understanding of
the parties in this more enlightened age."'
176
174. The decision in Zenith was primarily concerned with antitrust matters. The pro-
nouncement that the parol evidence rule would apply only to the original pairtles to a
release was implied in the text and expressly made in a footnote. Id. at 347 & n.12.
175. Calamari & Perillo 340.
176. Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 1971).
